Methane Matters

Methane credits: A Dangerous Distraction from Real Solutions

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Introduction

Methane is the second most harmful greenhouse gas after carbon dioxide (CO_2), responsible for one-third of current warming.[1] Methane emissions have increased by 29 per cent since 1990 and already contribute to about 0.5°C of warming.[2] The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report states that global methane emissions must be reduced by 34 per cent below 2019 levels, by 2030, to meet the goal of the Paris Climate Agreement and prevent climate tipping points from irreversibly changing the planet's climate system. .[3] The UN Environment Programme's Global Methane Assessment further found that methane emissions must be reduced by 45 per cent by 2030, compared to 2020 levels.[4] Beyond its climate impact, methane also contributes to the formation of tropospheric ozone, a harmful air pollutant which causes approximately one million premature deaths each year, as well as between 79 to 121 million tonnes of crop losses annually.[5]

Global attention to methane has grown rapidly in recent years. The 2021 launch of the Global Methane Pledge (GMP), now joined by 159 countries, marked the first coordinated international effort to tackle methane emissions across sectors. Since then, countries have started developing methane action plans and regulations, and companies are increasingly adopting methane mitigation targets.

This momentum has also prompted growing interest in market-based mechanisms. Methane credits, which are tradable certificates issued to projects claiming to reduce or avoid methane emissions, are increasingly promoted as a simple, low-cost instrument for meeting climate goals. However, two decades of experience have shown that crediting systems tend to exaggerate climate benefits, create perverse incentives, and divert resources from real emission cuts. Methane credits also face additional problems unique to the gas itself, including short-lived climate impacts, serious data uncertainties, and the risk of locking in polluting infrastructure instead of transforming it. Despite the fact that the failures of carbon markets act as cautionary tales, methane credits can be bought by governments or companies to compensate for their own emissions and are now being incorporated into both voluntary markets and international cooperation frameworks such as Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

This briefing analyses what is driving the use of methane credits and the issues that accompany them. It explores the structural weaknesses inherited from carbon markets, the added challenges specific to methane, and examples from real-world projects that reveal how these systems function in practice.

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I.The rise of methane credits: definition, demand, and policy drivers

1. What are methane credits?

As pressure grows to cut methane emissions, methane credits are being promoted as a quick and visible way to demonstrate progress. They are tradable certificates issued by third-party institutions to projects that claim to reduce or avoid methane emissions. Each credit represents one tonne of methane, converted into carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO_2e) units using Global Warming Potential 100 (GWP100), that has supposedly been prevented or destroyed due to the projects in question. Companies or governments can purchase these credits to compensate for their own emissions. Like other forms of carbon credits, methane credits function within two main types of markets:

- **Compliance markets,** which are regulatory schemes where companies are legally required to compensate for their emissions, either by holding allowances or by purchasing approved carbon credits. Cap-and-trade systems like the EU ETS are one form of compliance market, where emitters must surrender allowances for their emissions. In the EU ETS, methane is only included for shipping.[6] Other systems, such as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), rely on mandatory offset credit purchases instead of trading emissions quotas.[7]
- **Voluntary crediting markets**, where companies voluntarily purchase offset credits.

Methane credits are part of the wider ecosystem of carbon crediting that includes forestry, renewable energy, and direct air capture projects, most of which target CO_2 emissions. This equivalence is misleading: it creates a false impression that methane and CO_2 are interchangeable, even though they have fundamentally different lifetimes and climate impacts. Methane credits risk becoming a substitute for long-term decarbonisation, when reductions in both gases should advance in parallel rather than one displacing the other.

Historically, landfill gas capture dominated methane crediting, but recent years have brought greater diversification of project types:

- **Waste sector:** capturing landfill gas and using it for energy.
- **Energy sector:** plugging abandoned oil and gas wells to prevent leakage.
- **Agriculture sector:** reducing methane from manure management systems or implementing alternate wetting and drying in rice paddies.
- **Biogas sector**: transforming organic waste or agriculture residues to produce energy.

These are largely end-of-pipe interventions that incentivise incremental emissions reductions rather than enabling the systemic transitions needed to avoid emissions at source. In the agriculture sector in particular, existing methodologies still do not recognise production model changes such as livestock reduction or plant-based transitions.

Currently, methane credits occupy a small segment of carbon markets: since 2004, only 19 million tons CO_2e of methane credits have been retired (meaning they have been removed from circulation after being counted towards a climate goal, theoretically preventing them from being sold or claimed again), accounting for less than 1% of all voluntary offsets retired.[8] However, they are one of the fastest growing-project types in the voluntary carbon market. In 2024 alone, retirements grew by 70%, outpacing most of the market, which experienced a decline.[9] This demand is driven and set to increase in importance due to corporate and policy changes.

2. Corporate demand

A cross-industry community has been buying methane credits. Largest purchasers in 2024 include energy providers (Civitas Resources, NW Natural, Endesa), food producers (Maple Leaf Foods), airlines (EasyJet), aerospace industry (Boeing), medical technology providers (Medtronic), and professional services (Marsh McLennan).[10] These are large, well-capitalised companies with direct operational emissions, that have the means and the leverage to reduce methane pollution within their own value chains. Instead, the demand for carbon credits will likely rise as an easy way to 'meet' these goals. Similarly, companies have increasingly made specific commitments to methane reduction, which could overly increase demand for methane credits.[11]

It is important to note that the offsetting approach stands in strong contrast to the guidance of the Science-Based Target initiative (SBTi), the gold standard corporate climate goal, which forbids offsetting, except for residual emissions with permanent carbon removal, such as direct air capture and storage. The SBTi has been under significant pressure from corporate stakeholders to relax these restrictions, particularly about allowing more offsetting for scope 3 emissions, which represent indirect emissions from value chains. So far, these changes have been prevented, in part by internal backlash from SBTi staff who maintain that allowing offsets would undermine the scientific integrity of emissions reduction targets.[12]

3. Policy incentives and emerging frameworks

Alongside private-sector demand, policy developments are opening new avenues for methane crediting through international and EU frameworks.

Internationally, the Paris Agreement Article 6 mechanism might substantially increase the size of offset markets, by allowing countries to finance climate mitigation projects in other countries and count reduction towards their own climate goals.[13] Article 6 operates through two distinct mechanisms:

- **Article 6.2** enables bilateral or multilateral cooperation between countries through the transfer of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs), which represent emission reductions generated in one country and counted by another toward its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). Methane-related activities already feature in these deals, such as the Philippines–Japan bilateral programme and Thailand's rice cultivation methodology.[14]

- **Article 6.4** creates a centralised UN-supervised mechanism, the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), modelled on the former Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It certified emission reduction projects, including a large number of methane-focused activities, such as wastewater capture, animal manure treatment, and rural biogas schemes, and issues tradable credits that can be transferred internationally. The "methane avoidance" category alone could generate nearly 12 million tonnes CO_2e in Article 6.4 credits.[15] A large number of projects that were previously registered under the CDM are now seeking to be re-accredited under Article 6.4. As of November 2025, 2,444 CDM projects, around half of the eligible pipeline, have already applied to transition, covering around 900 million tonnes of CO_2e.[16] This would allow them to keep issuing credits under the Paris Agreement without undergoing any new integrity tests. This is controversial because many CDM credits lacked environmental credibility, yet they can still enter Article 6.4 without undergoing a proper reassessment, as long as they update to the new PACM methodologies before the end of 2025.[17]

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In the EU, multiple upcoming pieces of legislation are expected to drive demand for credits:

- **2040 climate target:** the text sets a new binding target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 90% by 2040. To achieve the objective, the EU will be allowed to rely on international carbon offsets for 5% of this objective.[18] Methane credits could be promoted as part of efforts to achieve this target, which would be detrimental to methane emission reductions in line with the Paris Agreement.

- **Carbon Removal Certification Framework (CRCF):** initially designed to certify carbon removals, the CRCF is designed to certify carbon removal, as well a "carbon farming" and soil emission reductions. By 2026, the European Commission is mandated to develop pilot methodologies for livestock enteric fermentation and manure management, likely including biogas certification. Independent analysis by Öko-Institut found the draft CRCF methodologies are "among the lowest quality methodologies" they have reviewed, setting lower standards than the Article 6.4 PACM and even lower than the CDM. The analysis warns that CRCF units could replicate the same integrity issues as avoided deforestation credits, which led to over-crediting and the collapse of voluntary carbon market prices. Although ongoing revisions are expected to strengthen these methodologies, the extent of improvement remains uncertain.[19]

At the same time, the EU is adopting direct regulation of methane. The EU Methane Regulation in the energy sector, which entered into force in August 2024, requires oil and gas operators to detect and repair leaks and bans routine venting and flaring. In parallel, some Member States are beginning to regulate agricultural methane through taxation. For example, Denmark has introduced a levy on livestock emissions that will gradually increase to around €93 per tonne of CO_2e by 2035.[20] However, loopholes remain in this taxation scheme. Overall, these regulatory approaches suggest a clear EU preference for tackling methane emissions directly at the source rather than relying on offsets.

While market and policy trends are creating the conditions for rapid growth in methane crediting, the underlying weaknesses that have long undermined offset markets have not been addressed. The following section explores these structural flaws and why they persist.

II.Why methane credits can’t deliver

Methane credits are part of a wider crediting system that has repeatedly failed to deliver real climate benefits. Over two decades of research show that carbon offset markets have achieved little measurable impact while delaying the structural and technological changes needed to cut emissions.

A recent international review, based on 1 billion tonnes of claimed reduction across key projects such as renewable energy and forest protection, found that fewer than 16 percent of carbon credits represent genuine emission reductions.[21] The study found that many developers rely on selective or outdated data, unrealistic assumptions, and weak methodologies that create perverse incentives and allow over-crediting. It concluded that carbon crediting mechanisms would need fundamental reform to contribute meaningfully to climate mitigation. A transformation that is unlikely in the short term.

1. Lessons from two decades of carbon credit failures

The failures of the carbon market stem from a mix of structural, technical, and political flaws that have persisted despite years of reform attempts.

One of the many problems is weak additionality. Most methodologies require that activities are not legally mandated to demonstrate additionally, that is, the project must deliver emission reductions that would not have occurred without the incentive provided by carbon credits. While this rule aims to prevent double counting, where the same emission reduction is claimed by more than one entity (such as a country and a credit buyer), this condition could backfire by discouraging regulators from introducing new policies on the assumption that voluntary markets are already addressing the problem. This dynamic slows the adoption of robust climate regulation and entrenches dependence on offset mechanisms that fail to drive systemic change.[22]

A second issue is the overwhelming focus on low-cost, non-transformative reductions. Projects often target easily accessible emission reduction from existing infrastructure rather than driving structural changes to avoid emissions. For example, a large number of forestry projects issue credits for protecting forests that already exist, rather than investing in regeneration or restoration efforts, which require more time and resources.[23]

Verification processes add another layer of fragility. Third-party verification, designed to ensure integrity, often struggles to balance industry expertise with genuine independence. Research reveals fundamental flaws in third-party verification systems. Auditors are typically hired and paid by the very project developers whose work they assess, creating a clear conflict of interest. Research on Verra, the world’s largest voluntary carbon credit registry, found that 64 per cent of certified auditors had been involved in projects later shown by peer-reviewed studies to have significant over-crediting issues.[24] These are structural, not procedural, weaknesses. They cannot be fixed through additional training, stricter oversight, or isolated sanctions, because they stem from a system that allows developers to choose and fund their own auditors.[25] The problem is made worse by the fact that key decisions about additionality, leakage, and permanence are highly subjective, leaving too much room for bias and manipulation.[26]

Weak governance and market incentives also make carbon credit systems highly vulnerable to abuse. Developers often pick the registry or standard that will approve their project most easily, known as “registry shopping”.[27] Another common problem is “baseline manipulation”, where projects exaggerate their claimed emission cuts by using unrealistic “before” scenarios.[28] In some cases, this even encourages projects to raise emissions at first so they can later claim bigger reductions.[29]

Carbon markets often also perpetuate what can be described as climate neo-colonialism, allowing wealthy emitters in the Global North continue to pollute while using the land, forests, and communities of the Global South to “neutralise” their emissions. Local people are left to shoulder the environmental costs of northern consumption, allowing rich countries to delay real action at home. This approach not only shifts the burden of mitigation but also undermines fairness: when Global North economies buy cheap credits from easy, low-cost projects in the Global South, they make it harder and more expensive for those countries to meet their own NDCs.[30]

In addition, offset projects have in several cases violated land and human rights in the Global South. In Tanzania, for example, two large soil carbon projects, the Longido and Monduli Rangelands Carbon Project (funded by Volkswagen and ClimatePartners) and The Resilient Tarangire Ecosystem Project (by The Nature Conservancy,) target nearly two million hectares of Maasai grazing land. These projects impose rotational grazing restrictions for up to forty years, fundamentally disrupting traditional pastoral mobility that is central to both Maasai culture and sustainable rangeland management. The Maasai International Solidarity Alliance has documented serious violations, including the absence of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC), opaque contracts, and disregard for international human rights norms. Critically, there is no robust scientific evidence that the imposed grazing restrictions will result in additional carbon storage meaning these projects risk producing credits with no real climate value that harm communities while providing no measurable environmental benefit.[31]

Finally, the integration of offsets into compliance systems, such as the EU Emissions Trading System, has shown that these instruments can weaken rather than strengthen regulation. During Phase II (2008–2012), operators were permitted to use international credits under the Kyoto Protocol, but this practice was later restricted and banned after an oversupply of cheap offsets depressed carbon prices and undermined the system’s integrity. This experience shows that offsets can weaken, rather than strengthen, regulatory action.[32]

2. The unique challenges of methane crediting

Methane crediting inherits all the weaknesses of broader carbon markets while introducing additional problems unique to the gas itself. The first is a fundamental temporal mismatch. Methane stays in the atmosphere for just over a decade, while CO_2 lasts for centuries, yet most accounting systems treat the two as if they were the same. The GWP100 metric allows companies to offset immediate, high-impact methane emissions with credits from activities that reduce longer-lived gases such as CO_2 or chlorofluocarbons (CFCs), where the climate benefits only appear much later.[33] This creates a fundamental mismatch between when warming occurs and when it is supposedly compensated. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reinforces this problem by treating methane only as a CO_2-equivalent gas, ignoring its near-term climate, air quality, and health impacts. When using GWP100, methane’s strong but short-lived warming is averaged over a century. This averaging gives the false impression that constant methane emissions continue to drive additional warming each year, when in reality, if methane emissions stay constant, their significant effect on temperature is felt mostly in the first decade, demonstrating the impact of methane emissions on short term warming. A few jurisdictions, such as New York and Maryland, are moving towards using GWP20, but they remain exceptions.[34] Article 6.2’s bilateral framework offers greater flexibility than the centralised Article 6.4 mechanism. In theory, this means countries could choose to use GWP20 or other metrics aligned with project timelines in their cooperative agreements. However, broader UNFCCC reporting requirements still rely on GWP100, and no country has yet implemented alternative metrics under Article 6.2. Lobbying from the big agriculture industry has contributed to some countries looking to use an alternative measurement called GWP*. Introduced by Allen et al, GWP* treats changes in the methane emission rate as more important than the total emissions, which rewards very small reduction and penalises very small increases in emissions relative to a high baseline, favouring historical emitters and industries.[35] Moving to GWP* would make some methane-heavy countries and companies look like they are causing ‘no additional warming’, even when total methane levels remain high. This could lead to the creation of more credits than

are actually justified, allowing continued pollution while appearing to make progress on paper. Academics have likened this to a polluter who has been pouring 100 barrels of pollution into the river every day, pouring just 90 barrels instead, and being rewarded for 'cleaning up the river.[36] .[37]

Methane is also systematically undervalued. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) values it at around $1,600 per tonne, excluding key impacts such as ozone-related mortality (which would add at least another US$760 per tonne) and crop losses.[38] By contrast, voluntary carbon markets price methane credits between US$2 and US$8 per tonne, capturing less than one percent of the real societal cost.[39]

Reliable monitoring and verification pose another challenge. Methane emissions are widely underreported. Standard emission factors don't work as reliably as they do for CO_2. In the energy sector alone, estimates suggest actual emissions are around 80 percent higher than what countries report to the UNFCCC.[40] Many governments and private certifiers lack the capacity, infrastructure, and resources needed to operate credible monitoring systems, making it even harder to verify claimed reductions under methane projects. Major food and agriculture companies, including Danone, Arla, Nestlé, Cargill, PepsiCo, and Unilever, have gone further by creating their own certification system under the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative (SAI) Platform. Its Regenerating Together framework lets companies set their own definitions and standards for regenerative agriculture, using them for insetting or potential offsetting. While framed as flexible and farmer-led, this approach effectively bypasses independent oversight and weakens environmental integrity.[41]

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III.Case studies: how methane credits work in practice

The following case studies illustrate how methane credits are applied in practice, and the recurring integrity and effectiveness problems they face. Each example reflects broader trends in how credits are being used to monetise methane abatement, while reproducing the same systemic weaknesses seen across carbon markets.

1. Oil and gas: plugging orphan wells

In the United States, tens of thousands of abandoned oil and gas wells leak methane into the atmosphere. Carbon credit developers have turned this into a commercial opportunity: by plugging these "orphan" wells and claiming the avoided emissions, they generate tradable methane credits. Over the past two years, roughly five million credits have been issued from such projects.[42]

The U.S. Congress has also earmarked federal funds for well clean-up, suggesting these crediting projects are not additional, and operators are typically legally responsible for plugging wells, therefore generating credits don't meet additionality criteria.

However, weak enforcement and loopholes have created a grey area that the credit markets exploit. Many states struggle to verify ownership, as companies often transfer wells to financially unstable entities before declaring bankruptcy, effectively offloading their cleanup obligations. Research shows that some wells targeted for crediting may still have legally responsible owners, but regulators lack the capacity to enforce action. Bonding requirements are often inadequate, and state databases contain errors and inconsistent ownership records.[43] This means carbon credits often subsidise companies to fulfil existing legal obligations rather than incentivising truly additional emission reductions, fundamentally violating the additionality principle essential to offset integrity.[44]

Even when there is additionality, quantifying methane reductions remain highly uncertain. Leakage rates vary widely by well, and baseline estimates rely on short-term measurements extrapolated over years. Methane can migrate through nearby unplugged wells or fissures. This makes it difficult to establish a reliable baseline for avoided emissions. True monitoring therefore requires continuous monitoring and independent audits, yet many methodologies rely on one-time assessments. For example, Rebellion Energy Solutions reported leakage rates from six plugged wells in Oklahoma that were around 68 kg/hour, hundreds of times higher than typical scientific estimates of 10–30 g/hour.[45] Moreover, methane emissions often decline naturally over time as reservoir pressure drops, and it is unclear how long a sealed well truly stays leak-free.

Finally, carbon credit revenues (estimated $10–30 per tonne CO_2e for these credits) often fall short of actual plugging costs, meaning public subsidies still carry much of the financial burden.[46]

2. Waste sector: landfill gas capture

Capturing methane from landfills was one of the first and most common credit-generating activities.[47] As organic waste decomposes, it emits methane, and projects that install gas-collection wells and flares, or gas-to-energy systems, can claim credits for capturing and managing the gas. In theory, this addresses a major emission source while generating usable energy; in practice, the environmental integrity is often weak.

Additionality is often low, as many large landfills already collect and flare gas due to regulations, or to generate power. An analysis of U.S. landfill offset projects under a top standard found that nearly 50% of credits were likely non-additional, as the landfills captured methane continuously even during periods when they weren't earning credits.[48] This means the credits do not actually incentivise new methane reductions, but merely paid for business-as-usual operations.

Even where projects do increase methane capture, they typically cannot capture all emissions. Rather, most methane emissions from landfills escape before the gas capture technology is put in place and operating. The CDM project at Durban's Bisasar Road landfill in South Africa is a well-known example. While it captured methane, over 60 percent of landfill gas still escaped to the atmosphere. By extending the landfill's lifespan to keep earning credits, the project arguably increased total methane generation.[49] This reveals a fundamental perverse incentive: the more waste a landfill receives, the more methane it produces, and the more credits it can earn. Such dynamics encourage waste expansion rather than prevention. The outcome can be increased overall emissions (due to residual methane leakage and fossil energy used for incineration) and significant social harm (loss of livelihoods for recyclers, local pollution).

3. Livestock sector: manure and biogas

Large-scale livestock operations (beef, dairy and pig farms) emit methane from both enteric fermentation (cow burps) and manure management. Credit-based solutions focus mostly on manure: installing anaerobic digesters to capture methane from manure lagoons and convert it to biogas, which can be used as fuel. In California, this practice is incentivised not just by voluntary offsets but through the state's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) credit market. Under LCFS, dairy biogas is so highly rewarded that it's treated as a "carbon-negative" fuel.[50] Effectively, fuel suppliers burning dairy biogas earn credits because the methane avoidance is counted as offsetting more CO_2 than the combustion it emits. This has turned California's dairy methane into a lucrative credit stream: some mega-dairies now earn as much revenue from selling LCFS credits as from selling milk.[51]

The deeper problem lies in the incentive structure. Because credit revenues scale with the amount of methane captured, farms have a financial motive to expand herd sizes and manure volumes to generate more credits. This directly conflicts with the broader climate goal of reducing livestock methane through smaller herds, dietary shifts, or improved pasture management. The dynamic is not hypothetical: the HFC-23 scandal has shown us how offset systems can create perverse incentives. Under the CDM, manufacturers of HFC-22 refrigerant received credits for destroying HFC-23, a waste by product. However, the CDM paid dozens of times more than the actual destruction cost, creating such enormous profits that destroying HFC-23 became more valuable than selling the primary product. Under the CDM, chemical firms in China and India were found over-producing byproduct HFC-23, a powerful greenhouse gas, simply to destroy it and claim lucrative carbon credits.[52] The practice generated vast profits without real emission cuts, prompting the EU and UN to reform CDM rules and ban HFC-23 credits, exposing major flaws in global carbon-offset systems.[53]

Livestock methane credits risk repeating this pattern, and recent U.S. evidence confirms these concerns. A report from Friends of the Earth U.S. found that large dairies with methane digesters expanded their herds faster than the state average, showing that biogas incentives drive growth rather than cuts. The study highlights three major distortions: policies reward manure systems that maximise methane output, encourage herd expansion to generate more credits, and concentrate production among the biggest operators. It also found that oversight is dangerously weak: neither the EPA nor the Unites State Department for Agriculture (USDA) is monitoring whether these billion-dollar investments are actually reducing greenhouse gas emissions.[54]

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Conclusion

Methane mitigation offers one of the fastest and most cost-effective opportunities to slow near-term warming. However, the evidence shows that methane credits are a fundamentally flawed instrument. Overreliance on offsets diverts attention and resources away from the systemic reforms needed to deliver real and lasting reductions. Effective methane action requires strong regulation, accountability mechanisms, and increased financial assistance to cut emissions directly at their source, while delivering clear co-benefits for air quality and health. Excluding credits from compliance systems and corporate net-zero claims will keep pressure on governments and companies to innovate, decarbonise, and contribute meaningfully to global methane reduction efforts.

Cross-Cutting Recommendations

The following recommendations outline the policy shifts necessary to pivot toward a robust and effective methane mitigation strategy, ensuring that methane reduction efforts complement, rather than compete with, long-term CO_2 decarbonization.

1. Reform methane accounting frameworks

Current accounting systems, which typically convert methane into a CO_2-equivalent unit using Global Warming Potential 100 (GWP100), fundamentally misrepresent methane's near-term warming impact.

- Develop methane-specific accounting: Develop and implement methane-specific accounting systems that track reductions separately from CO_2. This enables an accurate assessment of near-term climate impacts and prevents the offsetting of permanent, long-lived CO_2 emissions with temporary methane reductions.
- Incorporate health and climate co-benefits: Systematically incorporate the significant health co-benefits resulting from reduced tropospheric ozone formation into policy and valuation models.
- Advocate for UNFCCC Framework updates: Advocate for updates to the UNFCCC framework that explicitly recognize methane's unique characteristics, moving away from treating it merely as generic "CO_2 equivalent" and instead focusing on its role as a powerful short-lived climate pollutant.

2. Prioritise direct regulation

To drive real, systemic change, governments must move beyond reliance on offset mechanisms and instead implement strong regulations.

- Adopt methane mitigation target: a binding target sets the baseline for any mitigation action plan, providing a clear objective to guide the measures adopted, and a reference point to track progress.
- Implement direct regulation: Governments should implement and enforce robust methane policies, including:

- Bans on routine venting and flaring,
- Regular leak detection and repair (LDAR) programmes,
- Promotion of healthier diets with less and better meat and dairy,
- Linking subsidies with support for dietary shifts, diversification of protein production, and transition away from industrial agriculture,
- Mandatory targets for bio-waste collection,
- Goals to reduce residual waste generation.

↘ Integrate Complementary Mitigation: methane mitigation efforts must be integrated into climate planning in a way that is clearly understood to complement CO_2 reduction and removal efforts, ensuring they do not compete for resources or dilute the pressure for long-term decarbonisation.

3. Provide targeted financial support

To avoid reliance on credits for methane mitigation, other forms of financial support need to be scaled up and expanded:

↘ Scale up non-offset financing**:** increase the financial support for enabling activities (institutional strengthening, capacity-building and training, policy development and implementation) for Global South countries, to allow them to build capacity within their Governments to develop methane action plans and legislations.

↘ Expand multilateral support**:** Multilateral development banks and climate funds must expand support for critical methane projects, as core components of the Global Methane Pledge implementation.

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